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It has been suggested that corporate law is statutory; and on this
basis, one should focus his attention only upon a state's legislative enact-
ments.' No supposition could be further f[om correct.
It is true that corporate law is of a rather late historical development;
and for this reason, one does not encounter the nicetics that the law
merchant impressed upon such fields as negotiable iustruments or partner-
ships. Corporations existed at an early date; however, their economic
activities were large in scope, and there were likewise only a relatively few
such organizations in operation. Corporations, therefore, did not generate
the large amounts of litigation that were found, for example, in such
areas as negotiable instruments, partnerships, and agency - all of which
enjoyed an intricate development at common law.2  It remained for the
advent of the twentieth century to create the large body of court-made
law that is such an important part of corporate jurisprudence.
How does all this affect a summary of Florida laws? The answer
lies primarily in a point of perspective. It is important to realize that
statutes continue to be a basic source of authority;3 but it is equally im-
portant to realize that a vast body of corporate principles must be obtained
from judicial decisions. It may be correct to say (as some have suggested)
that "there is no such thing as a common law of corporations," but
practicality demands that one respect the accumulation of court-made
principles.
There has been a fair amount of judicially-enunciated principles in
Florida, although the quantity has certainly not been excessive. This
does not necessarily mean that every conceivable question has been settled
by either a Florida statute or case. It does mean, though, that prospective
litigants show a propensity to look to the principles settled in other states -
on the rationale that Florida courts will generally apply accepted concepts
of corporate law. This inclination on the part of the Florida courts is
apparent in an examination of the cases in the last two years. Such a
viewpoint by the judiciary is wholesome. Commercial law of all types
should be predictable; and such predictability may be achieved by pre-
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
1. STEVENS, Handbook of the Law of Private Corporations, 1-14 (2nd ed, 1949).
2. In fact, uniform statutes governing negotiable instruments and partnerships
are largely reflective of the long-acceped principles of the law merchant.
3. In Florida, the great bulk of laws affecting corporations is found in FLA . STAT.
chapters 608, 613, and 614 (1953).
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supposing that the Florida courts will adopt commercial principles adopted
in other jurisdictious.
THE CORPORATE ENTITY
It is basic corporate law that the corporate entity (or fiction) will
not be disregarded except upon a showing of the most compelling cir-
cumstanccs.4 This basic doctrine continues to be recognized in Florida.
A deadlock of directors is not such an impasse as to warrant a disregard
of the entity.5 Instead, the court suggested that relief be sought under the
Florida statutes permitting a dissolution.0 The remedy was statutory disso-
lution; and not a disregard for the corporate entity.' The separateness
of the corporate entity has also been re-affirmed in other recent decisions.8
NAMES
In Florida, it would Piow appear that even slight dissimilarities are
adequate enough to bar an enjoinment of the use of a previously pre-empted
corporate name?
In one case,' 0 a Florida corporation sought to enjoin a foreign cor-
poration from using a corporate name already pre-empted by the Florida
firm. The effort of the Florida corporation was unsuccessful. Thus, United
Life Ins. Co., a Florida corporation, was denied an injunction against the
foreign corporation's use of the name United Life Ins. Co. of Illinois. The
court ruled that the two corporate names were sufficiently dissimilar; and
in its opinion, the court said:
Where the words selected (by a corporation) for a corporate
name are chosen from the public domain and imply a national
business, and where the territory in which it operates is one that
will probably be reached through the natural expansion of an
established institution, which is in fact national in scope, (said
corporation) cannot demand a complete exclusion when the
(established institution) bids entry, but must be content with such
explanatory matter as will prevent deception, although it may not
entirely eliminate confusion by the careless."
Distinctions between corporate names are naturally a matter of rela-
tivity.12
4. Cross v. Cohen, 80 So.2d 360, 361 (Fla. 1955), where the court said, "the
complaining party must show that the corporation was actually organized or used to
mislead creditors or to perpetrate a fraud upon them."
5. Kay v. Key West Development Co., 72 So.2d 786 (Fla. 1954).
6. FLA. STAT. § 608.28 (1953).
7. The court stated, "As we view the matter, full relief can be granted without
destroying the legal existence of thc corporation." Kay v. Key West Development
Co., 72 So.2d 786, 789 (Fla. 1954).
8. Scheiner v. Adamco, Inc., 81 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1955); Gross v. Cohen, 80 So.2d
360 (Fla. 1955).
9. United Life Ins. Co. v. United Life Ins. Co., 70 So.2d 310 (Fla. 1954).
10. Ibid.
11. Id. at 312.
12. Federal Sec. Co. v. Federal Sec. Corp., 129 Ore. 375, 276 Pac. 1100 (1929).
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FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
As might be expected, litigation arose in the area of foreign corpora-
tions.13 Experience has shown this area to be a fertile ground for litigation
in Florida.
14
In one instance, the Supreme Court stated that the presence of a
mere salesman in Florida did not constitute "doing business" by a foreign
corporation; 15 and service upon the Secretary of State was therefore not
binding upon the corporation) 0 In another instance, 17 the court ruled
that a corporation's business activities were extensive enough to warrant
a finding of "doing business" in Florida; and hence, service under Section
47.16 of the Florida Statutes was proper. In that case, more than a mere
sales solicitation was involved. The foreign corporation furnished its
local brokers with instructions and supplies for presenting a "credit in-
demnity plan," and the performance of a contract which could take place
only in Florida. Such a situation is indeed different than a mere solicita-
tion of a sales order which is to be filled and shipped from another state.
In another case, the court emphasized that a contract of employment with
a foreign corporation was valid even though the corporation had failed to
domesticate itself in Florida.' s The view is a reasonable one, and also in
accord with the Florida Statutes.' 9 Certainly, a plaintiff who sues such
a non-qualifying corporation should be required to do so on the hypothesis
that he is suing a firm that has both the rights and responsibilities of a
duly-qualified corporation. 20
13. Statutes concerning foreign corporations appear in FLA. STAT. chapter 613 ( 1953).
14. This is due to the fact that a great deal of difficulty is encounered in
interpreting what acts of a foreign corporation constitute "doing business," so as to
make it amenable to domestication in a state. Thus, in Mason v. Mason Products Co.,
67 So.2d 762, 763 (Fla. 1953), the Supreme Court of Florida said,
Each case of this kind must rest on its own bottom for the simple reason
that whether service is valid depends on what the facts are. There is no way
to lay down a general principle applicable to all cases.
15. Mason v. Mason Products Co., 67 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1953).
16. The procedure for such service appears in FLA. STAT. § 47.16 (1953).
17. State v. Harrison, 74 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1954).
18. Frantz v. McBee Co., 77 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1955).
19. FLA. STAT. § 613.04 (1953).
20. This view was summarized by the Supreme Court of Florida in Frantz v. McBec
Co., 77 So.2d 796, 797 (Fla. 1955), wherein the court said:
Section 613.04, Florida Statute, F.S.A., provides that 'The failure of any
such foreign corporation to comply with the provisions of this chapter shall
not affect the validity of any contract with such corporation * * *' Thus,
the contract of employment between McBee and plaintiff's decedent was a
valid and subsisting one, despite MeBee's failure to qualify under Chapter 613.
It contemplated work to be performed wholly within this State, wherever it
was executed (which is not shown by the record). If the death of plaintiff's
decedent had occurred without the fault of anyone, and was otherwise within
the terms of the Act, could McBee be heard to say that it was not liable
for the death benefits awarded by the Act, since it had not qualified to do
business in this state? We do not think so. By the same token, it has the
right to say that its liability under the Act carries with it a corresponding
right as to the limit of its liability under the Act.
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CORPORATE MANAGEMENT
Cases arising in the corporate management area usually reduce them-
selves to a question of personal responsibilities of officers and directors.
Management, in an economic sense, is a matter of managerial personalities;
and it is therefore not surprising that litigation centers around this clement
of personalities.
An effort was made in one Florida case to impose a personal liability2'
upon directors for preferential transfers of the assets of a corporation in
financial distress.22  The statute states:
The directors or officers of a corporation who shall violate or be
concerned in violating any provision of this section shall bc per-
sonally liable to the creditors and stockholders of the corporation of
which they shall be directors or officers to the full extent of any
loss such creditors and stockholders may respectively sustain by
such violation.
23
Such a notion of liability is based on the "trst fund doctrine," which
has been adopted in Florida.24
In ruling upon the alleged preferential transfer, the court stated that
"there is no provable loss to appellants by virtue of this transfer;" and
hence, recovery was denied. 25  The view of the court is based on the
rationale that a mere exchange of one form of security for another does
not necessarily indicate a preference. More must be shown. In addition
to the exchange it was necessary to show some detriment resulting from
the preference. Such a detriment was not shown.
Another case 20 recognized that a corporation's officers and directors
did not have the authority to borrow at usurious rates. The court em-
phasized the Florida usury laws27 were applicable with equal force to
"artificial persons as well as individuals." 28  The court's opinion also
emphasized that the broad grant of powers in Section 608.1329 does not
21. The imposition of liability was attempted under FLA. STAT. § 612.45 (1951).
22. The court mentions a prohibition against intentionally preferential transfers
by actually or imminently insolvent corporations. Middletown v. Plantation Homes,
71 So.2d 503 (Fla. 1954).
23. FIA. STAT. § 612.45 (1951).
24. Middleton v. Plantation Homes, 71 So.2d 503 (Fla. 1954).
25. Ibid.
26. Sodi, Inc. v. Salitan, 68 So.2d 882 (Fla. 1953).
27. FLA. STAT. § 687.03 (1953),
28. See note 26 supra.
29. FLA. STAT. § 608.13(1) (a) (1953), which states:
Every corporation shall, unless otherwise provided by its certificate of
incorporation or by law have power to: * * * Contract debts and borrow
money at such rates of interest and upon such terms as it, or is board of
directors may deem necessary or expedient and shall authorize or agree upon,
issue and sell bonds, debentures, whether secured or unsecured, and execute
such mortgages, or other instruments upon or encumbering its property or
credit to secure the payment of money borrowed or owing by it, as occasion
may require and the board of directors deem expedient.
CORPORATIONS
authorize borrowing at usurious rates. The court's opinion reaches a
sound conclusion of statutory construction. Certainly, the policy of the
usury laws should be applied to all business transactions. 'There would
appear to be no justification for exempting corporations from their purview.
This should be accepted even though some corporations might find it
difficult to borrow money at a legal rate of interest. As the court indicates,
any relief from such difficulty must come from "the Legislature - not the
Courts."90
RECEIVERS
In one very brief opinion the court indicated the extraordinary nature
of a receivership appointment. Thus, the court said:
The power of appointment of a receiver for a corporation should
be exercised only where the exigencies demand it and no other
protection to the applicant appears,31
The court then noted that there had been "no sufficient allegation of
fraud, insolvency, mismanagement, or other meritorious considerations.' 32
On the basis of this decision, it would appear necessary that the peti-
tion for appointment of a receiver indicate, in clear-cut language, the
necessity for such appointment - and the need for resort to such extra-
ordinary relief. Pleading tactics are important. As the court suggests, it
becomes the responsibility of the petitioner to justify his request by indi-
cating facts to support his position. Such facts, as also suggested by the
court, may qualify if they constitute "fraud, insolvency, mismanagement,
or other meritorious considerations." The facts must be affirmatively
pleaded by the petitioner.
TRANSFER OF CAPITAL STOCK
The question of transfers of capital stock has often come before the
court. This has been a prolific source of litigation in Florida, as elsewhere.
In Gerken v. Streit,33 the court refused to find that a wife had been
subjected to duress in forcing her to endorse stock certificates. The opinion
of the court leaves little doubt that the Florida courts will require clear
and convincing evidence of alleged duress before ruling a contract voidable.
The tone of the opinion indicates that a party alleging duress must be able,
clearly and definitely, to sustain his burden of proof. In expressing its
attitude toward allegations of a husband practicing contractual duress on
his wife, the Florida court quoted from Oliver Twist in saying:
If the law presumes that what the wife does in the presence of
her husband she does under compulsion the law is an ass and a
bachelor.34
30. See note 26 supra.
31. Papazian v. John Kulhanjian, 78 So.2d 85 (Fla. 1955).
32. Ibid.
33. 66 So.2d 245 (Fla. 1953).
34. Id. at 247.
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Another case"5 held that where purchasers of the capital stock of
a business alleged fraudulent statements made to them in the sale of the
stock, the subsequent execution of a new contract by the purchasers
waived any claims based on such allegations of fraud. The decision
suggests a caveat to be followed in negotiations subsequent to a fraud alle-
gation. Thus, a purchaser would be well advised to reserve his right to
damages where he enters into a new contract relative to an alleged stock
fraud, otherwise the purchaser is apt to find himself precluded from recovery
on the previous fraud on the rationale that part of the consideration for
the new contract was a waiver of his fraud claim.
An interesting point arose in a case construing the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act. 30 The following statement appeared on an endorsed stock
certificate:
The original of this stock is subject in all respects to the terms of
a stockholders' agreement made under date of March 13, 1946,
the text of which is included among the minutes of the meeting of
the Board of Directors and Stockholders held on March 13, 1946,
and all persons to whom these presents may come are referred to
the said minutes for the text of said stockholders' agreement T
It was alleged that such notice on the certificate (as a reference to the
minutes) was inadequate under the provisions of the Uniform Stock Trans-
fer Act, which provides,
There shall be no restriction upon the transfer of shares so repre-
sented by virtue of any by-laws of such corporation, or otherwise,
unless the right of the corporation to . . . the restriction is stated
upon the certificate.8
The precedent established is an important one. In effect, a restriction
upon transfer may be effected by a reference to the corporation's minutes.
This would apparently also include a reference to the other official documents
of the corporation (such as its articles or by-laws).
DISSOLUTION
Will a court compel the dissolution of a corporation because of
disagreement or animosity among its stockholders? It has been held that
a dissolution will be decreed in only the most aggravated and compelling
circumstances. Mere animosity among the stockholders is not enough.39
Thus, in a ease refusing such a decree, 11 the Supreme Court said:
The liquidation of a corporation and the distribution of its assets
cannot be accomplished unless the corporation has practically dis-
35. Benn v. Key West Propane Gas Corp., 72 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1954).
36. This Act has bcci adopted in FA. S'rT. c, 614 (1953).
;7. Weissman v. Lincoln Corp., 7t So.2d 478, 483 (Fla. 1954).
38. FLA. STAT. § 614.17 (1953).
39. Freedman v. Fox, 67 So.2d 692 (VIa. 1953).
40. Ibid.
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continued all of its business, or is no longer capable of being made
to carry out the corporate functions for which it was chartered....
The drastic action of dissolving a corporation will not be justified
unless its affairs have reached the sorry state where the purposes
for which it was organized are no longer possible of attainment,
4
1
Here again, the court has expressed its strong inclination to preserve
the corporate entity. The corporation is a healthy creature. Few animals
can equal its vitality. Much formality is required in its creation; and an
even greater degree of formality is required for its extinction.
42
STATUTORY CHANGES
A few corporate statutes were enacted during the 1955 session of the
Florida Legislature. These enactments, of course, have modified tie fabric
of corporate law. Completeness, therefore, suggests that the scope of this
legislation be summarized.
Agricultural co-operative articles must now state whether or not the
corporation is to have a perpetual life; or, if not, the tern of years of the
corporation.4 s  The previous life was limited to 50 years. 4' Now, either
a perpetual life or a life for a period of years is permissible, this also being
the situation in corporations organized for private profit.4 5 In this same
connection the new law48 permits the majority stockholders or members
of a co-operative to convert it into a corporation for private profit.4 7
A statute has provided for the organization of development credit
corporations. These firms may be organized under the general laws of
Florida subject to certain limitations.4 8  The statute contains detailed
prescriptions. It opens the way for a new and useful form of business
organization in Florida, and both the statute and the form of authorized
business organization will find a welcome reception in the state's economy.
The maximum rate of interest for corporate debtors has now been
raised to 15%,.49  This change has been made in order to enable firms in
financial difficulties to extricate themselves. Often, such extrication is
possible only by the payment of an unusually large interest rate.50
41. Id. at 693.
42. Where a corporation is dissolved, though, a trustee situation is created. Thus,
in Trueman Fertilizer Co. v. Allison, 81 So.2d 734 (Fla. 1955), a corporation was
dissolved because of nonpayment of the capital stock tax. The court held that beneficial
title to the corporate assets accordingly vested in the stockholders, with the directors
having legal title, as trustees. This is in accord with FLA. STAT. § 608.30(6) (1953).
43. Laws of Fla., c. 29813 (1955).
44. FLA. STAT. § 618.04(4)(1953).
45. FLA. STAT. § 608.03(2)((e(1953).
46. Laws of Fla., c. 29813 (1955).
47. Such a conversion would be tinder FLA. STAT. c. 608 (1953).
48. Laws of Fla., c. 29776 (1955).
49. Laws of Fla., c. 29705 (1955).
50. There is an amendment of FLA. STAT. §§ 687.02 and 687.03 (1953).
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A statute now requircs non-profit corporations to secure a permit to
solicit funds for charitable purposes. Such a permit is obtained from the
clerk of the circuit court, and the corporation is further required to file
an annual financial statement' This statutory change is an important
one. Some kind of licensing arrangement for such solicitations has long
been the subject of debate and discussion, and the permit requirement
appears to be a conspicious step in this direction.
There has been some modification 2 in the requirements of the
articles of incorporation. 53  Many of the changes deal with the firm's
financing, although organization is also considered. For example, the
articles may now contain a provision for cumulative voting for directors.
Other basic doctrines concerning corporate organization and management
appear in the statute. The enactment 4 represents a detailed description
of a large array of important changes in Florida corporate laws. It is an
important statute, and from the business man's point of view, one of the
most important enactments of the legislative session. The lawyer engaged
in corporate practice would therefore be well-advised to read the vast
array of detailed prescriptions - which should be read in their original
text - and which do not lend themselves to sunmarization.
51. Laws of Fla. c. 29992 (1955).
52. Laws of Fla. c. 29886 (1955).
53. FLA. STAT. § 608.03 (1953) contains these requirements.
54. See note 52 supra.
